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The Secret FDA Memo That Changed Everything—But Stayed Under Wraps
In the spring of 1993, as headlines warned of possible links between cell phone radiation and brain tumors, two FDA scientists penned a memo that should have sparked a seismic shift in public health policy. Instead, Drs. Mays Swicord and Larry Cress’s findings, which stated that microwaves could “accelerate the development of cancer,” were tucked away in an internal agency document—while the official FDA stance played down any such risk.
Recently uncovered through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, the memo offers a window into how science is sometimes managed behind the curtain of regulatory politics. It exposes the chasm between private warnings and public reassurances, raising troubling questions about the influence of industry pressures and the fate of critical research on RF (radiofrequency) radiation.
A Snapshot of 1993: Public Fear Meets Quiet Revelations
By early 1993, CNN was reporting lawsuits linking cell phone use to brain tumors, stoking widespread alarm and rattling telecom stocks. The Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA), under immense pressure, initially sought FDA supervision of a research program to quell public fears.
Behind the scenes, however, FDA biologists Swicord and Cress from the Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) reached a far more sobering conclusion:
“Of approximately eight chronic animal experiments known to us, five resulted in increased numbers of malignancies, accelerated progression of tumors, or both.”
They also cited in vitro research pointing to a cancer risk from microwave exposure. In other words, the data they had reviewed appeared to “strongly suggest” a danger from microwaves such as those used by early cell phones.
Yet, in an official “Talk Paper” released around the same time, the FDA publicly stated that evidence suggesting microwave-related health effects was merely “limited.” The final disclaimer was almost dismissive: “If there is a risk … it is probably small.”
Private vs. Public Stances
The discord between internal memos and public statements was striking. While the Swicord-Cress memo emphasized a “compelling case for further research,” the FDA’s official line portrayed any risk as minimal and uncertain. Insiders recount that the agency was trying to strike a delicate balance: acknowledge potential hazards while reassuring a nervous public (and jittery markets) that evidence was not definitive.
“Limited Evidence” vs. “Strong Suggestions”
- Internal Memo: Warned of data showing microwaves might accelerate cancer development.
- Public Talk Paper: Described only “limited evidence” and emphasized “much uncertainty.”
Dr. Larry Cress, one of the memo’s authors, later underscored that the memo conveyed their honest scientific assessment. The question wasn’t whether the database was conclusive—rather, it showed enough red flags to warrant deeper scrutiny.
The Players and the Pressures
Industry Concerns
At the time, the CTIA was desperate to reassure consumers and investors that cell phones were safe. It briefly considered asking the FDA to oversee new research into microwave health effects—perhaps hoping that official involvement would soothe public anxiety. But that strategy was soon abandoned, and the “safe” messaging continued largely unchecked.
Conflicting Agency Roles
The FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) was charged with analyzing the risk, but not necessarily with a free hand. Dr. Elizabeth Jacobson, then the CDRH’s deputy director for science, compiled the Swicord-Cress findings into a briefing for upper management. That briefing described “nonthermal and cytotoxic effects” at levels consistent with cell phone exposures—startling implications that rarely filtered out to the public.
Meanwhile, the National Cancer Institute (NCI), another key player, also weighed in. According to these newly released documents, NCI scientist Dr. Richard Adamson “adamantly opposed” letting industry money fund a federal research program, fearing a conflict of interest. Nevertheless, substantial independent research on cell phone safety remained elusive, and no large-scale, definitive study emerged during this critical juncture.
The Science They Cited
The Guy-Chou Study
Swicord and Cress were especially concerned about a long-term microwave exposure study by Drs. Bill Guy and C.K. Chou at the University of Washington. Although critics dismissed the study because it found no single “target organ” where tumors predominated, the FDA scientists argued that this widespread effect was precisely what might happen if microwaves accelerated existing malignancies. If RF exposure speeds up the progression of various cancers, you’d see spikes in tumors throughout the body.
The energy deposition in the test animals, they noted, resembled levels absorbed by cell phone users. For Swicord and Cress, this was a red flag—one that demanded urgent, more conclusive research.
The EPA’s Earlier Warning
Three years before the cell phone scare grabbed national headlines, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) drafted a report suggesting microwave radiation be classified as a possible human carcinogen. The agency reached its conclusion partly by looking at the same Guy-Chou data and at findings by Polish researcher Dr. Stanislaw Szmigielski. Yet, like the Swicord-Cress memo, the EPA’s cautionary stance never received wide public traction.
Funding Struggles and Research Gaps
Swicord and Cress recommended a robust follow-up program “to either confirm or refute” previous experimental results. But internal emails suggest that some FDA staff believed the scientists used strong language in hopes of securing funding for their sector of the CDRH. Dr. Cress denies it was a funding ploy, maintaining it was an objective statement of scientific uncertainty.
In any case, no major FDA-led effort on cell phone microwave effects materialized. Instead, the CTIA eventually funded its own research program, supervised by Dr. George Carlo, which was fraught with controversy and later denounced for insufficient scientific rigor.
A Decade Later: Shifts in Perspective
By the early 2000s, Dr. Swicord left the FDA for Motorola’s Florida Research Labs, while Dr. Cress remained at the CDRH. Both eventually softened their stances. “Over 300 studies have been done…there is no indication of a problem,” Swicord said in 2003, though critics question whether industry affiliations influenced his revised outlook.
Still, the original 1993 memo underscores a critical moment in regulatory history. Scientists identified a “compelling case” for further research into microwave-induced cancer risks, yet that momentum was lost as the FDA’s public messaging and industry assurances pivoted toward minimizing alarm.